In Brief
Decisions made under uncertainty show a suboptimal variability whose origin is usually ascribed to the peripheries of the decision process. Drugowitsch et al. show that computational imprecisions in the decision process itself account for a dominant fraction of choice suboptimality.
INTRODUCTION
Humans show a remarkable ability to make efficient decisions in a wide range of situations, from perceptual decisions based on sensory cues to social and economic decisions based on preferences and reward. Identifying the computations underlying decisions is essential for understanding human cognition and its neural substrates. In many situations, making decisions requires combining multiple pieces of ambiguous or even conflicting information from external cues (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013) , a task that is optimally performed by Bayesian probabilistic inference (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Ma et al., 2006; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) . This inference process is at the heart of many forms of decisions, ranging from the categorization of an ambiguous sensory stimulus (e.g., Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Weiss et al., 2002; Ernst and Banks, 2002) to the reinforcement of a reward-yielding action (e.g., Behrens et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2005 Daw et al., , 2011 , i.e., any task that requires inferring a ''latent state'' from noisy or ambiguous cues. Although human perceptual and reward-guided choices have been shown to resemble Bayes optimality in such conditions (Navalpakkam et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011) , they typically exhibit a large variability beyond what can be explained by the provided evidence and are thus inherently suboptimal (Beck et al., 2012) .
Most empirical studies have attributed such choice suboptimality to imperfections in peripheral stages of decision making at the input and output of the inference process. In perceptual categorization tasks, errors are typically attributed to taskindependent noise in sensory processing preceding the taskdependent inference process (Osborne et al., 2005; Brunton et al., 2013; Kaufman and Churchland, 2013) . In reward-guided learning and abstract reasoning tasks, by contrast, suboptimal choices are often ascribed to stochasticity in the response selection following the decision process (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al., 2006; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Vul and Pashler, 2008; Vul et al., 2009) . In these tasks, however, it is theoretically impossible to distinguish between these peripheral imperfections and errors arising from the inference process itself (Tsotsos, 2001; Whiteley and Sahani, 2012; Beck et al., 2012; Renart and Machens, 2014; Dayan, 2014) , such as systematic deviations or biases from Bayes-optimal inference (Beck et al., 2012) or unstructured variability or noise in underlying neural computations (Renart and Machens, 2014) . Indeed, perceptual categorization tasks make no distinction between the relevant feature(s) of sensory cues and the information they provide for the decision. For example, in the click-count discrimination task introduced by Brunton et al. (2013) , the noisy perception of clicks (i.e., imperfect sensory processing) is behaviorally indistinguishable from the noisy accumulation of noiseless click percepts (i.e., imperfect inference). Similarly, in reward-guided learning and abstract reasoning tasks, the number of presented cues remains constant across decisions, making it impossible to distinguish between variability in inference and response selection. Consequently, the origin and structure of human choice suboptimality remain largely unclear.
To address this issue, we devised a computational modeling approach and an experimental protocol derived from a canonical evidence accumulation task, such that imperfections in sensory processing, inference, and response selection have separable statistical signatures in observed choices. We then decomposed the statistical signature of inferential imperfections in terms of a ''bias-variance'' tradeoff between (1) systematic deviations from Bayes-optimal inference and (2) unstructured variability stemming from the limited computational precision of mental inference. This experimental framework revealed that in contrast to current views, the suboptimality of human choices made under ambiguity arises dominantly from imperfections in inference, of which two-thirds could not be accounted for by any systematic deviation from Bayes optimality and thus resulted from the limited precision of neural computations implementing inference. In absolute terms, this limited precision of mental inference caused a substantial loss of 30% of the theoretical information provided by each evidence sample, which is not accounted for by existing theoretical models of decision making.
RESULTS

Probabilistic Inference Task and Human Choice Behavior
To identify the origin of human choice suboptimality, we created a probabilistic cue combination task derived from the wellknown ''weather prediction'' task (Knowlton et al., 1996; Poldrack et al., 2001; Gluck et al., 2002; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) , in which key properties of the underlying inference process (i.e., extracting and accumulating the evidence provided by successive cues) could be manipulated independently of sensory processing and response selection: (1) the length of inference (i.e., the number of cues that need to be combined) and (2) the dimensionality of inference (i.e., the number of alternatives to choose from). This experimental protocol afforded the comparison of human choice behavior to Bayes-optimal choices and the quantification of the extent to which inferential imperfections alone are responsible for the observed choice suboptimality.
In every trial, participants observed a sequence of 2-16 oriented patterns or cards and were then asked to indicate which category or deck among two or three possible ones they judged the sequence to have been drawn from ( Figure 1A ; see Experimental Procedures). As expected, participants' choices reflected the combination of the pieces of information conveyed by successive cards presented within each trial; indeed, choice accuracy ( Figure 2A ) increased gradually with the number of presented cards in both two-and three-category conditions (repeated-measures ANOVA, both F 7,147 > 45.2, p < 0.001). Although categories were randomly selected across successive trials, human choices in both conditions were slightly biased toward the category drawn on the previous trial and shown as feedback ( Figure 2B ; t test against zero, both t 21 > 3.5, p < 0.002), but not toward the previous choice (both t 21 < 0.5, p > 0.2) or categories drawn on earlier trials (all t 21 < 1.8, p > 0.05). Furthermore, choice accuracy remained stable over the course of the experiment (Figures S1A and S1B; first versus second half: both t 21 < 0.5, p > 0.5).
Estimating the Separate Contributions to Choice Suboptimality In this task, the optimal decision-making model integrates ambiguous information across successive cards through Bayesian inference by accumulating evidence in favor of each deck and then chooses the deck associated with the largest total evidence ( Figure 1B) . As for participants, the model predicts choice accuracy to increase with the number of drawn cards. However, the model choice accuracy systematically and substantially exceeds human performance in both conditions ( Figure 2A ). This suboptimality of human choices may stem from imperfections in sensory processing, inference, or response selection, each of which affects the decision-making process in different ways ( Figure 1B ). Furthermore, in our experimental protocol, these three sources of choice suboptimality have distinct statistical signatures on the variability of human choices compared to Bayes-optimal ones ( Figure 1C ; see Experimental Procedures).
We first observed that the variability of human choices increased quasi-linearly with the number of presented cards in both the two-and three-category conditions (Figure 3A, dots; both F 7, 147 >15.2, p < 0.001). Assuming that this variability derived from a unique source of imperfections (sensory, inferential, or selection based), we then parameterized this source in an otherwise optimal decision-making model and fitted the predicted variance structure to the observed choice variability (Figure 3A, lines; see Experimental Procedures) . In both conditions, fitting the sensory source model led to postulated orientation discrimination thresholds of an order of magnitude larger than those tabulated in the literature for comparable stimuli (Burbeck and Regan, 1983; Webster et al., 1990; Burr and Wijesundra, 1991) (two-category condition: 19.0 ± 0.8 degrees [deg.]; three-category condition: 23.4 ± 0.9 deg., mean ± SEM). Even more problematic, the fitted thresholds differed significantly between the two-and three-category conditions, despite involving the exact same stimuli (Figure 3A , left; paired t test, t 21 = 4.8, p < 0.001). Besides, the linear increase of human choice variability with the number of presented cards rules out imperfections in response selection as a possible source ( Figure 3A, right) .
Bayesian model comparison across the different models consistently revealed that the inferential source model (Figure 3A , middle) explained human choices decisively better than alternative accounts in both conditions ( Figure 3B ; both Bayes factors >10 12 , both exceedance p > 0.99). Here, the inferential source model postulates imperfections in the interpretation of the evidence provided by each card in favor of each category and/or in the accumulation of evidence across cards (see Figure 1B and Experimental Procedures), such that we refer to both under the umbrella term of ''inferential'' imperfections. We confirmed the validity of our model comparison among the three hypothesized sources of choice variability through a validation procedure using synthetic choice data from each model (Figures 3C and S2; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) . Additional analyses revealed that the magnitude of the inferential imperfections measured separately (A) Trial description, generative distributions, and experimental conditions. Each trial consisted of a sequence of 2-16 cues (cards) presented at approximately 3 Hz, drawn from a generative probability distribution (deck) centered on one among two or three cardinal orientations. At sequence offset, participants were prompted to indicate the deck from which they believed the cards were drawn from by pressing a button. The drawn category was indicated following each choice by a transient color change of the fixation point. In the two-category condition (bottom left), sequences of cards were drawn from one of two color-coded circular Gaussian distributions of low concentration k = 0.5 centered on +45 (pink) and À45 (cyan), whereas the three-category condition (bottom right)
consisted of three distributions of low concentration k = 0.7 centered on +60 (red), 0 (green), and À60 (blue).
(B) Optimal decision making in this task is achieved by accumulating evidence for each category conveyed by each orientation sample q j (log likelihoods, l j;A=B ), then accumulating evidence L j;A=B for each category by summing log likelihoods and finally contrasting the accumulated evidence across categories (log posterior) to choose the most likely category given the observed orientation samples. In the three-category condition, such evidence accumulation is independent across categories. In the two-category condition depicted here, it is sufficient to accumulate log-likelihood ratios and decide based on the sign of the resulting log posterior. Sensory variability is task independent and modeled by adding Gaussian noise ðs sen Þ to the orientation percepts. Inferential variability is task dependent and modeled by adding independent Gaussian noise to the log likelihoods, with respect to each category ðs llh Þ, and/or to each step of the evidence accumulation ðs acc Þ. Variability in response selection corresponds to stochastic action selection by adding Gaussian noise to the final log posterior ðs sel Þ.
(C) Distinct signatures of sensory, inference, and selection variability on the suboptimality of resulting choices. Sensory variability (top panel) alters the perceived orientation of each sample, which causes orientation-dependent (e.g., q 1 versus q 2 ) and correlated variability in the resulting log likelihoods l A , l B and l C , which, due to the non-linear mapping between orientation and log likelihood, becomes non-Gaussian. Because each sample is affected independently, the resulting choice variability scales with the number of presented samples. Inference variability (middle panel) alters the interpretation and accumulation of the evidence in favor of each category. Similar to sensory variability, the resulting choice variability scales with the number of presented samples. However, it affects individual log likelihoods and their accumulation independently (l A , l B , and l C uncorrelated and independent of q j ), leading to different trial-by-trial choice predictions that can be distinguished through model comparison. Selection variability (bottom panel) alters the ''readout'' of the accumulated evidence during response selection, leading to uncorrelated variability in the accumulated evidence across categories (L A , L B , and L C uncorrelated). In contrast to the two other sources of variability, the resulting ''probability-matching''-like choice variability is independent of the number of presented samples.
for the first and second halves of each experiment was similar (t 21 = 1.0, p > 0.2) and correlated significantly across participants (r = 0.67, df = 20, p < 0.001), thereby reflecting a stable and robust feature of the participants' decision performance ( Figure S1 ).
Quantifying Sensory Noise Independently of Probabilistic Inference
We have so far distinguished sensory and inferential imperfections on the basis of their statistical signatures on choice variability. In a second experiment, performed by a new set of participants ( Figure 4A ), we segregated between these two sources of choice suboptimality more directly by explicitly measuring an upper bound on participants' orientation discrimination thresholds in our protocol. The experiment interleaved two-category probabilistic inference task trials used in the first experiment (''accumulation'' trials) with orientation categorization task trials performed only on the last card of the sequence (''last-card'' trials; see Experimental Procedures). As expected, participants' choices in last-card trials were based solely on the orientation of the last pattern (logistic regression of choice against last card tilt from between-category boundary, t 16 = 6.4, right-tailed p < 0.001) and not on the evidence provided by preceding cards (logistic regression of choice against Bayes-optimal accumulated evidence: t 16 < 0, righttailed p > 0.5).
To reliably estimate an upper bound of the orientation discrimination threshold in last-card trials, we deliberatively chose last card orientations close to the category boundaries in these trials (1-8 deg. from the horizontal and vertical axes; Figure 4B ). Fitting the optimal decision-making model with only sensory imperfections to participants' choices in last-card trials, we obtained a mean discrimination threshold of 2.4 ± 0.2 deg. (± SEM), matching values measured for similar stimuli (Burbeck and Regan, 1983; Webster et al., 1990; Burr and Wijesundra, 1991) . However, these estimated thresholds predicted choice accuracies in accumulation trials that dramatically exceeded those of participants ( Figure 4D ). If we reversed the procedure and estimated orientation discrimination thresholds using sensory imperfections now fitted to participants' choices in accumulation trials, we recovered (as in the first experiment) implausible thresholds of a higher order of magnitude (21.0 ± 0.9 deg., paired t test, t 16 = 21.1, p < 0.001), which were uncorrelated to threshold estimates from last-card trials ( Figure 4C ; linear correlation across participants, r 2 = 0.02, df = 15, p > 0.5). Bayesian model comparison further showed that a model featuring only sensory imperfections of identical magnitudes in accumulation and last-card trials explained participants' behavior decisively worse than a model including additional inferential imperfections in accumulation trials (Bayes factor > 10 48 , exceedance p > 0.99). Thus, sensory imperfections alone could not successfully explain the suboptimality of human choices observed in accumulation trials. Finally, comparing models with imperfections in sensory processing, inference, and response selection in those trials led to the same qualitative and quantitative conclusion as in the first experiment; inferential imperfections emerged as the prominent source of human choice suboptimality in our task ( Figures 4E and 4F ). 
Considering Multiple Simultaneous Sources of Choice Suboptimality
We next relaxed the assumption that choice suboptimality stems from a unique source of imperfections at the sensory processing, inference, or response selection stage by considering a model that features imperfections at all three stages simultaneously. We fitted this combined model to participants' choices in the two-category condition of both the first and second experiment (B) Bayesian model comparison between candidate sources of choice suboptimality in the two-category (top row) and three-category (bottom row) conditions: sensory variability (left bars), inference-driven variability (middle bars), and selection-driven variability (right bars). For each condition, the top panel depicts the results of random-effect comparisons (in terms of the probability of sampling each model, mean ± SD; p exc , exceedance probability), the bottom panel depicts the results of fixed-effects comparisons (in terms of the Bayes factor).
(C) Model fits to simulated sources of choice suboptimality in the two-category (left) and three-category (right) conditions: simulating sensory variability (left column), inference-driven variability (middle column), and selection-driven variability (right column). Same conventions as in (B). The bottom row shows the fraction of simulations, in which each model is deemed best for each simulated source of choice suboptimality. (blue category). Unpredictably, in half of the trials, the last cue was presented simultaneously with a tone, which prompted participants to respond not to the judged category of the sequence (''accumulation'' trials, top row) but to the category of the last card (''last card'' trials, bottom row), which, on these trials, was drawn independently from the category of the preceding cue sequence.
(B) Fraction correct in the ''last card'' trials with respect to the tilt of the last card from the closest category boundary (dots, mean ± SEM) fitted by a model assuming sensory variability, with an orientation discrimination threshold of 2.4 ± 0.2 deg. (lime line), and by a model assuming sensory variability estimated from ''accumulation'' trials (orange line).
(C) Comparison between orientation discrimination thresholds estimated using a model assuming sensory variability in the ''last card'' trials (horizontal axis) and ''accumulation'' trials (vertical axis). Dots show estimates from individual participants (error bars: full widths at half maximum likelihood); the dashed line is the identity line.
(D) Fraction correct in the ''accumulation'' trials, with respect to sequence length (dots, mean ± SEM). The gray line shows the predicted fraction correct choices for the best-fitting model, assuming variability in probabilistic inference, whereas the lime line shows the predicted fraction correct choices for the model, assuming sensory variability and fitted to ''last card'' trials. (E) Measured and predicted choice suboptimality estimates (dots, mean ± SEM) in the ''accumulation'' trials. Same conventions and results as in Figure 3A . The lime line shows the predicted choice suboptimality from a model assuming sensory variability and fitted to ''last card'' trials.
(F) Bayesian model comparison between candidate sources of choice suboptimality. Same conventions as in Figure 3B .
(excluding last-card trials) to compute the relative contributions of these three sources of imperfections to human choice suboptimality ( Figure 5A ; see Experimental Procedures). In the first and second experiment, the fitted model assigned 89% and 96%, respectively, of the observed choice variability uniquely to inferential imperfections (experiment 1: sensory: 5.8% ± 3.1%, inference: 88.7% ± 3.2%, selection: 5.5% ± 1.6%; experiment 2: sensory: 1.1% ± 0.3%, inference: 96.1% ± 4.3%, selection: 3.2% ± 4.2%, mean ± SEM; see Figure S2B ). Validating our model fits, we found that the fitted magnitude of sensory imperfections in this combined model corresponded to orientation discrimination thresholds (experiment 1: 2.6 ± 1.0 deg.; experiment 2: 2.2 ± 0.3 deg., mean ± SEM), which were virtually identical to the ones directly computed from last-card trials in the second experiment (2.4 ± 0.2 deg.).
To quantify the behavioral impact of each of these imperfections, we simulated the choice suboptimality due uniquely to each of these imperfections by setting, in turn, each of them at their best-fitting value while holding the two other imperfections at zero ( Figure 5B ). In the first experiment, we found that imperfections in sensory processing, inference, and response selection caused 2%, 13%, and 3%, respectively, of suboptimal choices (2%, 16%, and 3%, respectively, in the second experiment) across tested sequence lengths ( Figures 5B and 5C ). These results thus confirm that inferential imperfections are the main source of choice suboptimality in our task.
Partitioning Choice Suboptimality in Terms of a Bias-Variance Tradeoff Next, we investigated the structure of observed imperfections in mental inference. Inferential imperfections could correspond to systematic deviations from Bayes-optimal inference, often coined as biases in psychology. Such deterministic biases may arise for various reasons, e.g., because the agent performs Bayes-optimal inference based on wrong assumptions about the generative structure of the task (Beck et al., 2012; Dayan, 2014) or because the agent uses heuristics that deviate from Bayes-optimal inference (Tsotsos, 2001; Whiteley and Sahani, 2012) . Alternatively, these inferential imperfections might correspond to the limited precision of neural mechanisms implementing inference (Renart and Machens, 2014) , thereby generating unstructured fluctuations in resulting choices. These two causes have opposing choice effects in response to identical sequences of cues: deterministic biases would make the agent consistently repeat the same choice, whereas unstructured fluctuations would cause inconsistent and unrelated choices in response to identical sequences. (C) Predicted impacts of sensory, inference-driven, and selection-driven variability on the fraction of suboptimal choices (i.e., inconsistent with the normative Bayesian decision maker) in the two-category condition of experiment 1 (top row) and experiment 2 (bottom row). Same conventions as in (B). Note that the fraction of suboptimal choices decreases with the number of shown cards for all three sources of choice variability because the signal-to-noise ratio of the decision variable grows with the number n of shown cards (the signal grows with n, whereas the noise SD grows with ffiffiffi n p for sensory and inference-driven variability or remains constant for selection-driven variability).
To evaluate the relative contributions of these two causes of inferential imperfections, we conducted a third experiment with a task seemingly identical to the first experiment, including both two-and three-category conditions. However, and unbeknownst to participants, every card sequence was presented twice in distinct trials occurring at different points in time throughout the experiment, which allowed us to measure the consistency of choices across repeated sequences. We then used the bias-variance decomposition approach from the Estimator Theory to quantify the relative contributions of deterministic biases and unstructured fluctuations in inference, which partitions choice suboptimality into (1) a ''bias'' term arising from all possible systematic deviations from Bayes-optimal inference at play in our task and (2) a ''variance'' term that captures the intrinsic variability of choices unrelated to any systematic bias ( Figure 6A ). Importantly, this bias-variance decomposition captures all deterministic biases without requiring their explicit description and thus their knowledge as long as they (A) Theoretical relationship between the measured fraction of consistent choices for paired card sequences and the underlying variability structure. Two-dimensional plane representing the noisy log posteriors accumulated in two repetitions of the exact same sequence (each dot corresponds to a pair of trials). Across-repetition noise correlation (or structure) grows with the measured fraction consistent (in red, from left to right). For illustration purposes, we have assumed the noise-free log posterior to be uniformly distributed across trials. The left column corresponds to a fully stochastic observer (with no deterministic bias), whereas the right column corresponds to an almost perfectly deterministic observer (fraction consistent choices z1). The middle column corresponds to the biasvariance decomposition estimated in the human data.
(B) Decomposition of human choice suboptimality into deterministic biases (left side) and unstructured ''noise'' (right side, red) for the two-category (top row) and three-category (bottom row) conditions. The contribution of deterministic biases is split into modeled spatial (blue), modeled temporal (green), sequential (orange), and residual (gray) components. Dots indicate estimates of this biasvariance median split for trial subgroups: first versus second half and close versus distant pairs. Error bars show SEM.
(C) Impact of unstructured variability in mental inference on information loss (loss of mutual information between category and presented orientation per cue; information loss 1 = no mutual information; see Figure S3D and Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details on how loss is computed) in the two-category condition. Bars show estimates of the fraction of information loss sorted across participants (mode ± 95% credible intervals), with the contribution of unstructured variability highlighted in red (different shadings: min/max contribution). Small arrows indicate the average total ($40%) and unstructured ($25%) fraction of information loss.
(D) Predicted impacts of deterministic biases (blue lines) and unstructured variability (red lines) on fraction correct in the two-category (left panel) and three-category (right panel) conditions (dots, mean ± SEM).
remain stable across trials (see Experimental Procedures and Figure S3A ). In both conditions, participants made a substantial fraction of inconsistent choice to repeated card sequences ( Figure 7B , gray bars), confirming that choice suboptimality did not arise exclusively from deterministic biases. Furthermore, the fraction of consistent choices in response to identical card sequences exceeded that of a model featuring only unstructured fluctuations in inference ( Figure 7B , dashed lines; both t 17 > 7.3, p < 0.001). Quantitatively, the bias-variance decomposition attributed only 33% and 37% of the total choice suboptimality to deterministic biases in the two-and threecategory conditions, respectively (Figure 6B) , even when taking into account sequential dependencies across consecutive choices that contributed 7% and 1% of deterministic biases in the two conditions ( Figure 2B ). This means that about two-thirds of human choice suboptimality was unrelated to any deterministic bias and was consequently uniquely attributable to unstructured fluctuations in inference (with minor contributions of sensory noise and stochasticity in the response selection that amount together to less than 10% of the total choice suboptimality). In the two-category condition, these unstructured fluctuations alone amounted to a 29% loss in every piece of incoming information ( Figure 6C ). Interestingly, although the total choice suboptimality increased in the three-category condition relative to the two-category condition, the proportion with which unstructured fluctuations contributed to the total choice suboptimality was statistically indistinguishable between conditions (t 17 = 0.3, p > 0.5). In other words, the distinct contributions of deterministic biases and unstructured fluctuations to choice suboptimality grew in the same proportion when choosing among three categories instead of two categories. Using the same validation procedure as before (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures), we confirmed that our decomposition technique correctly estimated the biasvariance tradeoff on synthetic choice data from models featuring known proportions of deterministic biases and unstructured fluctuations ( Figure S2C ).
Characterizing the Nature of Deterministic Biases
Our bias-variance decomposition confirmed the presence of deterministic biases in mental inference. Some of them certainly affect the ''temporal'' accumulation of evidence, whereas others concern the ''spatial'' mapping of card orientations into the category space. To quantify the respective influences of these two types of biases, each card sequence was not only repeated identically, but also after shuffling the card presentation order and/or after mirroring pattern orientations relative to the mean orientation of the deck they were drawn from ( Figure 7A ). Importantly, these spatiotemporal perturbations preserved the total accumulated evidence in terms of Bayes-optimal inference. Consequently, the fraction of consistent choices should decrease when comparing temporally perturbed pairs of sequences to identical pairs only in the presence of temporal biases. The exact same prediction holds for spatial biases across spatially perturbed pairs of sequences. As expected, we found the fraction of consistent choices to decrease significantly for both temporally and spatially perturbed compared to identical sequences ( Figure 7B , colored bars; spatial perturbation: F 1,17 > 6.7, p < 0.05; temporal perturbation: F 1,17 > 52.2, p < 0.001; interaction: F 1,17 < 0.9, p > 0.2), indicating the presence of spatiotemporal biases in mental inference.
To characterize these spatiotemporal biases, we first fitted the contributions of cards presented at different positions in the sequence and of different orientations to participants' choices ( Figures 7C and 7D, dots) . We found that compared to Bayesoptimal inference, a card positioned closer to the choice and card orientations closer to vertical and horizontal orientations over-contributed to the inference process. These distortions corresponded to well-known cognitive biases overweighting more recent pieces of information (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Ossmy et al., 2013) and cardinal orientations (Girshick et al., 2011; Wei and Stocker, 2015) . We then considered a model featuring Bayes-optimal inference, along with explicit accounts of these cognitive biases ( Figure S5 ), as well as additional unstructured fluctuations in the inference process. Fitting this model to participants' choices ( Figures 7C and 7D, lines) showed that these biases account for the decrease in choice consistency observed across temporally and spatially perturbed sequences ( Figure 7B, dots) . Furthermore, a bias-variance decomposition accounting for these particular biases indicated that they could explain 72% and 46% of all deterministic biases in the two-and three-category conditions, respectively ( Figure 6B ). Importantly, we verified that modeling these biases explicitly during bias-variance decomposition did not modify our main conclusion: unstructured fluctuations in inference remained the dominant source of choice suboptimality ( Figure S6 ).
DISCUSSION
Making decisions often requires combining multiple pieces of ambiguous information from external cues (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013) . In such conditions, human choices derive from covert mental processes that resemble probabilistic inference (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Weiss et al., 2002; Ernst and Banks, 2002; Behrens et al., 2007; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) , but are typically highly variable and consequently often suboptimal (Beck et al., 2012) . Previous decisionmaking studies, ranging from perceptual categorization to reward-guided learning, have classically attributed this choice suboptimality to either noisy sensory processing in perceptual tasks featuring weak, ambiguous, or noisy sensory evidence (Osborne et al., 2005; Brunton et al., 2013; Kaufman and Churchland, 2013) or stochastic response selection in tasks featuring open questions (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Vul and Pashler, 2008; Vul et al., 2009) , sequential learning (Acerbi et al., 2014) , or volatile contingencies (Daw et al., 2006; Behrens et al., 2007) . However, the tasks used in these studies make it theoretically impossible to distinguish these peripheral sources of choice suboptimality from imperfections in probabilistic inference. By contrast, in the present study, imperfections in sensory processing, inference, and response selection were distinguishable by altering human choices with distinct statistical signatures. This allowed us to show that imperfections in inference alone accounted for about 90% of human suboptimal choices in our task, whereas imperfections in sensory processing and response selection together form a negligible fraction. Thus, inferential imperfections constitute an important source of human choice suboptimality, which may have been underestimated by previous studies and confounded with imperfections in sensory processing or response selection.
The analysis of choice consistency across repeated pseudorandom sequences of cues further reveals that only one-third of inferential imperfections stemmed from deterministic distortions of Bayes-optimal inference (Beck et al., 2012) . Importantly, our bias-variance decomposition approach further allowed us to establish the fraction of suboptimal choices that derives from all possible deterministic deviations from Bayes-optimal inference, only part of which could be identified explicitly. Unidentified biases possibly include adaptive gain coding, range normalization, and anchoring effects across successive cues or choice alternatives (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Albantakis and Deco, 2009; Louie et al., 2013; Cheadle et al., 2014) .
Consequently, our bias-variance decomposition indicates that two-thirds of inferential imperfections are neither related to the structure of our task (and any deterministic distortion associated with our task) nor to any misspecification of our computational model. We thus propose that this dominant fraction of human suboptimal choices reflects random fluctuations (i.e., noise) in inference, arising primarily from intrinsic variability in the computational and coding precision of elicited variables represented in populations of neurons (Renart and Machens, 2014) . In information terms, this intrinsic variability yielded a surprisingly large loss of about 30% in every piece of information in the canonical two-category condition, which raises the issue of whether it arises from a lack of attention or motivation, insufficient training, or increasing fatigue over the course of the experiment. None of these factors, however, appears to be a plausible explanation. First, a ''lapse'' probability parameter in our models captured random choices unrelated to stimuli ( Figures S2A and S7) , thus factoring out lapses in attention from our estimation of inferential variability. Second, the orientation discrimination thresholds measured in our task are consistent with values tabulated in the literature (Burbeck and Regan, 1983; Webster et al., 1990; Burr and Wijesundra, 1991) , indicating that participants were focused on the task. Third, accuracy did not rise over the course of the experiment, contrary to what insufficient training would predict. Fourth, the stable accuracy observed within each experimental session did not argue in favor of increasing fatigue. Consequently, this intrinsic variability appears to reflect the near-maximal precision of neural codes and computations implementing inference.
At the neural level, inference has been hypothesized (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Ma et al., 2006) and shown to engage parietal and prefrontal regions that encode and accumulate evidence along category-defining stimulus features (Freedman and Assad, 2006; Fitzgerald et al., 2011; Mante et al., 2013) . The inferential variability we measured here may arise at three stages of neural processing implementing inference: (1) in the neural mapping from sensory regions encoding relevant stimulus features (orientation in our case) to parietal and prefrontal regions encoding abstract categories (Soltani and Wang, 2010) , (2) in the neural coding of abstract categories in these associative regions (e.g., Mante et al., 2013) , and (3) in the neural updating of category-selective representations following a new piece of information (Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Cain et al., 2013) . Importantly, the inferential variability we estimated from behavior measures the effective precision of neural processing at the level of large ensembles of neurons implementing inference rather than the neural variability of individual neurons or synapses (Renart and Machens, 2014) , which presumably average out over large populations of neurons (Beck et al., 2012) . One possibility is that this limited precision is the result of computational constraints on neural circuits implementing inference. In particular, the maintenance of information over time in neural circuits (up to several seconds in our paradigm) might suffer from ''temporally diffusive'' noise, which grows with elapsed time in the decision process (Burak and Fiete, 2012) . Alternatively, the processing of successive cues might depend on a slow ''cognitive bottleneck,'' which limits the processing resources that can be allocated to cues presented in rapid succession (Wyart et al., 2012 (Wyart et al., , 2015 . These two accounts differ in terms of their dependency on presentation rate: a faster presentation rate should decrease choice variability for ''temporally diffusive'' noise, but increase choice variability in case of a ''cognitive bottleneck.'' Another possibility is that this limited precision reflects the neural implementation of sampling processes for realizing probabilistic inference (Haefner et al., 2016) . Such processes are effective algorithms for approximating Bayes-optimal inference, which rapidly become intractable in real-world situations (Fiser et al., 2010; Brooks et al., 2011) . They produce sequences of samples from posterior distributions over task-relevant variables like categories in the present study. Drawing few samples results in noisy posterior distributions (Lengyel et al., 2015) , corresponding to the intrinsic variability we identified here. Disentangling these different neural accounts of intrinsic variability in inference is beyond the scope of the present study and remains an open question for future work.
An important question concerns the potential function of inferential imprecisions: why do humans feature such a large degree of random fluctuations in inference if these fluctuations cause such a sizable fraction of additional, avoidable behavioral errors? The hypothesis of computational constraints on neural circuits implementing inference raises the issue of whether extensive practice of our task featuring few and ambiguous cues over days or weeks would induce the recruitment of additional neural resources and improve the effective precision of mental inference. Another possibility is that in volatile (changing) environments, a low computational precision comes at little cost because in such circumstances, a ''diffusion'' of belief distributions over task-relevant variables becomes the normative strategy (Behrens et al., 2007) , something that can be achieved by random fluctuations in inference. In this context, the limited precision of inference might even explain the presence of deterministic biases in decision making. For instance, if the precision of inference is low, it becomes advantageous to overweight the pieces of information that have been the least neurally processed, typically the most recent ones. Although ''recency'' biases are typically suboptimal in the context of noise-free computations, they may have evolved as optimizing inference in neural circuits implementing approximate computations.
In summary, identifying the origin of human choice suboptimality under uncertainty and elucidating the structure of the underlying variability is critical for understanding decision making and its neural substrates. Beyond noise in sensory processing and stochasticity in response selection, we found that imperfections in probabilistic inference are a significant contributor to human choice suboptimality. Critically, two-thirds of this choice suboptimality derive from random fluctuations in inference rather than from biased computations. This intrinsic variability reflects the effective precision of neural computations underlying inference. This computational precision sets a previously unsuspected low upper bound on the accuracy and ultimate predictability of human choices in uncertain environments, which needs to be accounted for in theoretical models of decision making.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants 63 healthy participants took part in the three experiments, with no overlap among the participants tested in each experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders (35 females, mean age: 24). All human participants provided informed written consent prior to the experiment, and both experiments were approved by the local ethics committee (Comité de Protection des Personnes, Ile-de-France VI, Inserm approval #C07-28, DGS approval #2007-0569, IDRCB approval #2007-A01125-48). Our sample sizes are similar to those generally employed for comparable studies.
Stimuli and Task Design
The task was a variant of the ''weather prediction'' task, in which participants were asked to infer the generative category (deck) of a sequence of stimuli (cards) among two (or three, see below) alternatives that differed in terms of their generative distributions ( Figure 1A) . Stimuli depicted high-contrast, noise-free Gabor patterns of varying orientation, presented at fixation at an average rate of 3 Hz (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). In each trial, the orientation of successive cards varied according to a circular Gaussian distribution (von Mises distribution; concentration k = 0.5 and 0.7 for the two-and three-category conditions, respectively) centered on a mean orientation characterizing each deck. The mapping rule between orientation and categories (represented as colors) was provided throughout the whole experiment by a static colored annulus surrounding the stimuli. Sequence lengths (i.e., the number of stimuli per sequence) varied unpredictably from 2 to 16 stimuli across trials. At sequence offset, participants provided their response by pressing one out of two (or three) keys with their right hand. Following each response, feedback about the true generative category of the sequence was provided via a transient color change in the fixation point.
Experiment 1 (25 participants) consisted of two conditions (choice among two or three categories, Figure 1A ), corresponding to two 50-min sessions taking place on different days. Both conditions were divided into short blocks of approximately 50 trials (each lasting about 5 min), such that participants could take short rest periods between them. Three participants were excluded from analyses because they misunderstood the task instructions; their decisions were based only on the last card of each sequence (as revealed by a standard logistic regression of choices).
Experiment 2 (20 participants) was identical to the two-category condition of experiment 1, except that the ''accumulation'' trials used in experiment 1 were randomly and unpredictably mixed with ''last card'' trials in equal proportions. Last-card trials were identical to ''accumulation'' trials, except that the last card was paired with a single auditory tone that instructed participants to report the category of this last card, irrespective of preceding ones. The last sample was drawn independently of preceding samples at 1, 2, 4, or 8 deg. from either of the two category boundaries corresponding to the horizontal and vertical axes. The experiment was divided into short blocks of 72 trials (each lasting about 7 min), corresponding to two 60-min sessions taking place on different days. Trials included sequences of 2, 4, 8, or 16 samples. Three participants were excluded from analyses because of chance-level performance in either accumulation or last-card trials.
Experiment 3 (20 participants) was similar to experiment 1 and again included the two-and three-category conditions. Experiment 3 consisted of two 50-min sessions taking place on different days. As in experiment 1, both conditions were divided into short blocks of approximately 50 trials. In each condition and unbeknownst to participants, each pseudo-random sequence containing 4, 8, or 12 samples was repeatedly presented at five occasions consisting of (1) an exact repetition of the original sequence, (2) the original sequence, in which the presentation order was shuffled, (3) the original sequence, in which sample orientations were mirrored with respect to the mean orientation of the generative category, and (4) the original sequence with both the abovementioned perturbations ( Figure 7A ). The temporal distance (in number of intervening trials) among these different presentations of the same sequence was controlled for within and across participants. No participant reported any repetition effects at the end of the experiment. Two participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not perform one of the two sessions.
Modeling and Fitting Sources of Choice Suboptimality
Here, we provide a summary of the used models. More details and discussion can be found in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
In trial n, after T n observed sample orientations q n1 ; .; q nTn ; the ideal decision maker accumulates log likelihoods [ ntk to form the log posterior z nTn k = P Tn t = 1 [ ntk , with respect to each category k, and chooses the category x n associated with the largest of these log posteriors, x n = argmax k ðz nTn k Þ (Figure 1B) . Each sample is generated by draws from a von-Mises distribution on a half-circle, with mean m k for category k, such that the log likelihood of the sample at position t, with respect to category k, is given by [ ntk = k cosð2ðq nt À m k ÞÞ. In each trial, the Bayes-optimal choice is deterministically related to the sequence of samples, such that all choice variability across trials stems from variability in presented samples.
To introduce additional choice variability, we considered various hypotheses ( Figures 1B and 1C) inf . In contrast to sensory noise, this noise causes uncorrelated Gaussian noise in the log posteriors, leading to different predictions of individual choices (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). We modeled two variants of variability at the inference stage: the first assumes additive noise to each log likelihood (''likelihood'' variability), resulting in T n noise terms, and the second assumes additive noise to the combination of log likelihoods (''accumulation'' variability), resulting in T n À 1 noise terms. The accumulation variability model provided better fits to the observed behavior (two-category: Bayes factor >10 2 , exceedance p z 0.81; three-category: Bayes factor >10 12 , exceedance p > 0.99; Figures S6B and S6C) , and is thus the ''inference'' model discussed in the main text. Third, we introduced stochasticity in response selection by drawing samples from the posterior belief taken to some power, pðx n = k j q n1:Tn Þfexpðbz nTn k Þ, where b is a free parameter that is fit to the observed behavior (b = 0, random choices; b = 1, posterior sampling; b/N, deterministic choices). This response strategy is indistinguishable from adding single constant-variance Gaussians added to the log posterior of each category (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Thus, in contrast to sensory noise and inference variability, stochasticity in response selection postulates that the magnitude of the additional variability is independent of the number of samples, T n , in the sequence. Finally, we considered a model in which all variability is introduced by a variable initial state of the log-posterior accumulator ( Figure S6 ). To distinguish between these different sources of choice variability, we fitted for each subject separately for each model the choices of all trials combined by a maximum-likelihood procedure that, on one hand, avoids local maxima and, on the other hand, estimates parameter uncertainty by the width of the posterior. We avoided confounders due to occasional random responses and response biases by adding a ''lapse'' probability parameter and K À 1 response bias parameters ( Figure S7 ). Model comparison (both fixed effects and random effects) was based on approximating the model evidence by the Bayesian information criterion. More details on model fitting can be found in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures. In all model fits, the concentration parameter k was used as a scaling parameter by setting it to its true value. Participants could have misestimated this concentration, but such a misestimation would not qualitatively change our conclusions (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Figure 3A shows the scaling of choice variability in two ways. The solid lines indicate the maximum-likelihood model predictions averaged across fitted participants. The dots show noise parameters re-fitted separately for each sequence length and each participant. In both cases, we did not include lapses and response biases in these fits to avoid model-dependent parameter biases across different sequence lengths. The model comparison in Figure 3B was based on model fits that included a lapse probability and response biases.
The fraction correct measured in ''last card'' trials presented in experiment 2 was fitted using a model featuring only sensory noise, precisely because no probabilistic inference was required to solve these trials (in the sense of combining the information provided by successive samples). We inferred the orientation discrimination threshold D q ( Figure 4C ) per participant and condition from 0:75 = FðD q = ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2s 2 sen p Þ, where F is the standard cumulative Gaussian, corresponding to the difference in orientations that results in 75% correct choices in a two-alternative forced-choice task, given a Gaussian orientation percept with variance s 2 sen . The fraction choice variability in Figure 5A was inferred per participant for the two-category condition by fitting a model that combined variability in sensory processing, inference, and response selection, resulting in a separate log-posterior difference variance estimate for each type of variability that contributes additively to the behavioral variability and could thus be decomposed. We could not apply the same rationale to the three-category condition because choices are based on two log-posterior differences rather than one.
The performance predictions in Figures 5B and 5C resulted from averaging over generated choices for 10 6 virtual trials for each participant and sequence length, with the same sequence statistics as those presented to the participants. This allowed us to provide predictions for all sequence lengths, including ones not used in the experiment. Choices were generated either according to the Bayes-optimal model or by models including single sources of variability whose magnitudes matched those shown in Figure 5A . The full model combined all three sources of variability and provides predictions for the actual sequences presented to the participants to make them directly comparable to participants' choice behavior. Unless noted otherwise, statistical analyses of differences of scalar modelfree measures (fraction correct, fraction suboptimal, and fraction consistent) or model-based quantities (e.g., estimates of choice variability) between conditions of interest (e.g., sequence length, two versus three categories) relied on standard, two-tailed parametric tests (e.g., paired t test, repeated-measures ANOVA) across tested participants (z20 in each experiment), i.e., outside the small-sample regime, thereby matching the core assumptions of the applied statistical parametric tests.
Modeling and Fitting the Structure of Choice Suboptimality
We modeled the bias-variance structure by assuming that inference variability results from a noisy likelihood b [ ntk = [ ntk + f k ðq nt Þ + ε ntk that can be decomposed into (1) the correct likelihood [ ntk , (2) a sequence-dependent deterministic bias f k ðq nt Þ, and (3) additive random fluctuations ε ntk . This model provided joint likelihoods for trial pairs, in which identical card sequences where shown with separate contributions of deterministic biases and random fluctuations. Thus, we could estimate these contributions by fitting participants' choice in pairs using the same maximum likelihood procedure as before. We quantified the contribution of explicit spatial and temporal perturbations and sequential choice dependencies to deterministic biases in Figure 6B by measuring how much of these biases could be ''explained away'' by modeling these perturbations and dependencies explicitly. Furthermore, we performed multiple control analyses to determine whether participants' choices featured slowly drifting biases, which the bias-variance decomposition could have mistaken for random fluctuations ( Figure S4 ). None of the control analyses suggested this to be the case. Details of the model, fitting procedures, and control analyses can be found in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
The performance predictions in Figure 6D were generated similarly to those in Figure 5B . The predictions for Bayes-optimal inference, those for a model with deterministic biases only, and those for one with unstructured fluctuations only were simulated for 10 6 virtual trials with the same sequences statistics as those seen by the participants. Those for the full model were based on the actual sequences presented to the participants to make them directly comparable to participants' choice behavior. The variability magnitudes used for simulation were those estimated from fits of the full model to the choice behavior of individual participants.
Assumed Deviations of Bayes-Optimal Inference ''Spatial'' distortions introduce deterministic perturbations into the mapping between the orientation of the presented sample and the associated log likelihoods, with respect to each category. We assumed three such perturbations that could occur in isolation or in combination. The ''orientation'' bias assumes that the perceived orientation was tilted by a constant angle ( Figure S5A ). The ''confirmation'' bias assumes a likelihood that is increased if positive and decreased if negative by the same value, and as such introduced an imbalance in how each sample contributed to the log posterior, with respect to different categories ( Figure S5B ). The ''oblique'' effect assumes a perturbation of the perceived orientation either toward or away from oblique orientations, depending on its parameter ( Figure S5C ). When modeling ''temporal'' distortions from Bayes-optimal inference, we assumed that samples within an observed sequence contributed with different weights to the final choice. We considered two variants. The first assume that with each new sample, the log posterior up to, but excluding, this sample is multiplied (i.e., either discounted or amplified) by a constant multiplicative factor. Overall, depending on the factor (lower or higher than one), this leads to ''recency'' or ''primacy'' effects ( Figure S5D ). The second variant assumes this factor to change linearly with the position of the current sample within the sequence and is thus more general than the first variant ( Figure S5E ). The mathematical description of each of these distortions can be found in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures. 
